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I
Presumptions help us make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Such
decisions are also the business of rhetoric, and so one might expect to find a
discussion of presumptions in the ancient handbooks of that discipline; as a
matter of fact, however, the term praesumptio there appears only to refer to the
anticipation of counter-arguments, and is thus used as an equivalent to
prolepsis (Quintilian 9.2.16-18). Instead, we find the concept of presumption as
related to decisions about doubtful facts and the distribution of burdens of
proof emerging in the context of Roman law. In this paper I will sketch in broad
outline the transition of the concept of presumption from a relatively
subordinate part of the Roman law to a central feature of legal disputations in
the revival of Roman law in the Middle Ages. I will first discuss features of
presumptions in the codification of Roman law that was undertaken at the
behest of the emperor Justinian in the sixth century CE and later became
known as the Corpus Iuris. In my discussion here, I will focus primarily on the
Digest, a vast collection of juristic pronouncements by leading Roman jurists,
collected from a literature spanning six centuries1. Then I will focus on the
treatment of presumptions in the second edition of the Libellus Pylei
Disputatorius, written by Pilius of Medicina, composed in the second half of
the twelfth century. In conclusion, I will briefly point to elements of these
developments that may be useful in considering the renewed contemporary
discussion about the role of presumptions in argumentation, a discussion that
has been stimulated particularly by Richard Gaskins' Burdens of Proof in
Modern Discourse, which highlights the paradigmatic significance of the
rhetorical manipulation of burdens of proof in legal reasoning.
II
Even before the term praesumptio was used to denote the concept, the
Roman jurist Quintus Mucius Scaevola introduced, at the turn from the second
to the first century BCE, a presumption into legal controversies about the
source of property that had passed to a woman. He argued that "when it is not
clear where the property has come from, it is more correct and decent to hold
that she got it from her husband or someone in his power." The later jurist
Pomponius (second century CE), who transmitted this pronouncement to us,
added the comment that "Quintus Mucius appears to have taken this view in
order to avoid any disgraceful inquiry involving a wife" (D. 24.1.51). This early
use of presumption in legal argumentation already shows the subtle interplay of
empirical and normative considerations that characterizes the treatment of
presumptions in the Roman law of the Corpus Iuris as a whole.
Legal presumptions take as their starting point an established fact (in the
example: a married woman holds property of uncertain origin), and then draw
from this a conclusion about an uncertain matter (here: the origin of the
property, which is presumed to have come from the husband). The structure of
presumptions thus resembles that of arguments from probability, and in the
Roman law we find several references to presumptions that people make as a
matter of empirical fact. For instance, a father presumes his son missing in war
to be dead (D. 12.6.3); people assume that slaves of some nationalities are
better than slaves of other nationalities (D. 21.1.31.21), or that a more recently
enslaved person will be easier to deal with than a slave of long standing (D.
21.1.37); or a father assumes that his wife will ultimately deliver to the children
whatever part of his property she has taken (D. 31.67.10). In such cases,
people form factual expectations on the basis of what they perceive to be
likely. Legal presumptions may also be based on such perceptions of
empirical probability, but they need not be. Once they are established, legal
presumptions create an entitlement to the conclusion towards which they point
(barring the possibility and permissibility of proof to the contrary).
The most fundamental legal presumption, that in favor of defendants, is a case
in point. It is stated at the outset of the Digest chapter entitled "On Proof and
Presumption" (D. 22.3.2): "Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who
denies." This rule is not based on the observation that plaintiffs are generally
less likely to make believable assertions than defendants, but rather on the
perception that it is fairer to impose the burden of proof on the plaintiff. This is
even clearer when we look at the burden of proof in criminal cases, where in
fact it is more likely than not that the defendant is guilty, since definitely more
defendants are convicted than acquitted. And that the underlying judgment
about the presumption of innocence is normative rather than empirical is made
quite clear in what the jurist Ulpian reports to us (D. 48.19.6) about a rescript of
the emperor Trajan, who held that in criminal cases nobody should be
condemned on suspicion, because "it was preferable that the crime of a guilty
man should go unpunished rather than that an innocent man be condemned."2
The emphasis is here not so much on which presumption is more likely to be
correct, but on which is less likely to lead to less acceptable consequences.
While generally it may be regarded as fairer to impose the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, the law of presumptions also establishes modifications of this
principle. Even before the general rule is stated in D. 22.3.2, the very first
excerpt under the Digest title "Proof and Presumptions" (D. 22.3.1)
establishes the exception that "[i]f the issue is whether someone has a clan or
gens, he must prove it." Here the burden of proof is imposed on the party who
is in a better position to provide the required evidence, regardless of whether
that party is the plaintiff or the defendant.
One of the reasons why it is fair to shift the burden to the defendant may of
course be that it appears more likely that the plaintiff's assertion is correct.
Thus for instance a defendant who has initially denied receiving a payment
must prove that it was owed once it is later shown that he did in fact receive it,
while generally the plaintiff who claims to have paid unowed money must prove
that it was not owed (D. 22.25 pr.). Even without the legal presumption, an
observer would be suspicious of a defendant who chooses to deny receiving
money rather than admitting receipt and asserting that the money was owed,
an assertion that would have the greater likelihood on its side, and that the
plaintiff would then have to disprove. But the legal presumption does more than
pointing to this shifted probability; it concludes that in such cases the likelihood
of the defendant's liability is great enough to justify shifting the burden of proof,
even though this will mean that some defendants will have to return money in
fact owed to them, simply because they cannot prove that it was owed.3
This presumption also gives to the fact of denial of receipt of payment more
weight than to all other potential credibility factors, such as the parties'
reputations for veracity: the fact that the plaintiff may be a notorious liar or
desperately short of cash, and the defendant a person of well-known probity or
immense wealth, does not lead to a similar shift of the burden of proof in such
cases; even though these facts, too, can have a definite bearing on who is
likely to be telling the truth in such cases, and may in some instances arguably
even have a greater bearing than the denial, which may sometimes be due to
carelessness or forgetfulness rather than deceptive intent. Thus, even where
presumptions rely on and reinforce pre-existing empirical probabilities, they
entail normative judgments as to which probabilities deserve such special
reinforcement; and this reinforcement goes beyond merely highlighting the
empirical force of certain probabilities by giving them the effect of shifting the
burden of proof, while disregarding the potential countervailing probability
implications of other circumstances.
Moreover, in several cases legal presumptions are clearly not, or at least not
clearly based on empirical probabilities. This is the case especially in
situations where the sequence of deaths is at issue in situations where no
clear proof is available. Thus in a case where a mother and her one-year-old
child die in a shipwreck and her husband will receive her entire dowry if the
child survived the mother, and only part of the dowry if the child died before the
mother, it is to be presumed that the infant died earlier, so that the husband
receives only part of the dowry (D. 23.4.26 pr.). In this passage it is claimed
that this decision was made because "it was more likely (verisimilius) that the
infant died before its mother," but there is really no clear empirical evidence for
the contention that children die before adults in disasters4. And in another
passage where a woman died in a shipwreck along with her son who had
attained puberty, the reason given for the presumption that the son died after
the mother is not that this is more likely, but that it is humanius (D. 34.5.22),
which may be translated as "more generous." The question is of course for
whom this is more generous, and the answer is that this assumption allows for
the son to inherit from the mother and thus for more of her estate to remain in
her husband's family upon the son's death, which would be regarded as an
appropriate outcome in the normal course of events. While in the other case
the wife's family receives the benefit of the doubt because the apparent
purpose of the arrangement passing on her entire dowry to the husband was to
provide for her child, a purpose that can no longer be served once the child is
dead.
That presumptions are often a vehicle for promoting a desirable policy rather
more than aiming at decisions based on factually accurate findings becomes
especially apparent in cases involving the freeing of slaves, where doubts are
not infrequently resolved by the law in favor of liberty. In one passage in the
Digest, the burden of proving that the testator did not intend to free a slave is
imposed on the heirs in cases when there is "a presumption that liberty
appears to have been conferred" because the words of the will can be
interpreted that way, even if other interpretations are possible as well (D.
40.5.24.8). This legislative intent to favor liberty by means of presumptions is
even clearer when it is established that in cases where a female slave is to be
freed if her firstborn child is male, she then bears twins one of whom is male,
and it cannot be established whether the boy was born first, it is to be
presumed that he was, because "the more humane view should be adopted
whereby the slave obtains her freedom and her daughter the status of being
freeborn on the presumption that the male child was the firstborn" (D.
34.5.10.1).
The intent to promote appropriate policy rather than accurate fact-finding by
means of presumptions is most apparent in cases where presumptions are
irrebuttable, where proof contrary to what is presumed is not allowed. It is
doubtful to what extent the Roman law of the Corpus Iuris established such
irrebuttable presumptions (Motzenbäcker 1958: 26ff.). In one passage in the
Code, the fact that a man and women who were suspected of adultery later
start living together or marry is treated as tantamount to a confession of
adultery, leading to their punishment for that crime; the possibility of a contrary
proof in their defense is not mentioned, but this could be due to the great
unlikelihood that such a proof of the negative could ever be offered, rather than
to the fact that such a proof is legally foreclosed (Motzenbäcker 1958: 28f.).
But I think that the legal provision with which this brief discussion of
presumptions in the Roman law began should also be considered in this
context. When Scaevola gives a married woman who has property of uncertain
origin the benefit of the doubt by holding that "when it is not clear where the
property has come from, it is more correct and decent (verius et honestius) to
hold that she got it from her husband or someone in his power," and
Pomponius explains this by saying that "Quintus Mucius appears to have taken
this view in order to avoid any disgraceful inquiry involving a wife" (D. 24.1.51),
it appears that in the absence of clear proof already in the possession of the
plaintiff who claims that the property did not come from the husband, further
investigations are not to be permitted in order to prevent "disgraceful inquiry"
(turpis quaestus) even if this might after all prove the plaintiff's claim. So in the
absence of readily available proof to the contrary, the wife's claim to her
reputation is evidently valued more highly than the plaintiff's financial interests,
regardless of what the actual facts might prove to be upon closer inspection:
what is more decent (honestius) is even more important than what is more
correct (verius).
At this point we can conclude our brief survey of the use of presumptions in the
Roman law by highlighting two points:
(1) While presumptions typically are introduced in cases of factual
uncertainties, these uncertainties are often used to achieve outcomes
promoting certain policies rather more than to resolve each situation in favor of
the empirically more probable assumption; normative appropriateness is thus
often elevated over empirical correctness.
(2) Even where the argument for the normative appropriateness of the favored
outcome is not explicitly made, it is important that the person who has to
decide the case be persuaded that this normative evaluation of the outcome is
right, or at least not completely unacceptable, since the presumption can often
easily be undercut by denying that the uncertainty which gives rise to the
presumption actually exists. To take the example just discussed, the judge can
accept a weak proof of the claim that the property did not come from the
husband, and thus avoid the presumption in favor of the wife. Another
possibility would be that the judge could interpret the rule to apply only to a
woman of completely unblemished reputation, and then accept proof of some
blemish making the presumption inapplicable. The procedural shift of the
burden of proof to one party in such cases is thus not always completely
effective in avoiding that an at least implicit substantive evaluation of the claim
of the other party favored by the presumption may have an influence on the
outcome. The distinction between rhetorical and legal presumptions is thus not
as clear-cut as it might initially seem.
III
While the rhetorical vicissitudes of presumptions remain at least partially
submerged in the Roman law of Antiquity, its revival in the Middle Ages,
beginning at the turn from the eleventh to the twelfth century, brightly highlights
their multifarious argumentative uses. As a particularly clear example of this
explicit rhetoricization of presumptions I will briefly discuss the second edition
of the Libellus Pylei Disputatorius, written by Pilius5 of Medicina, probably in
the final decade of the twelfth century6. The starting-point for Pilius' discussion
of presumptions in the first book of this work7 is the realization that in legal
scholastic disputations as well as in the trials for which these largely serve as a
preparation, it is often necessary to deal with doubts about uncertain matters8.
In such situations, presumptions serve as a kind of incomplete proof; they
provide, by means of extrinsic signs, credence or confirmation for a doubtful
matter (LPD 36r)9. This characterization of presumptions is close to Cicero's
definition of the concept of "argument," much relied upon throughout the Middle
Ages, in his Topica: an argument is a course of reasoning which provides
confirmation for a doubtful matter10. So according to this conception, a
presumption is a kind of argument whose distinguishing characteristic it is that
it takes as its starting-point an extrinsic sign for a matter which cannot be
established more directly, particularly by means of witnesses. Once such more
direct proof becomes available, the presumption is destroyed, unless the law
excludes such contrary proof; this corresponds to the modern legal distinction
between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions11. But Pilius' conception is
broader than the modern legal notion of presumption, since it opens for his
discussion the entire range of inartistic proofs, not merely of facts, but also of
the legal characterization of actions as permissible or impermissible,
justifiable or unjustifiable, excusable or inexcusable. This broadening is made
possible by Pilius' linkage of proof (probatio) with argumentation
(argumentum) by way of the definitions just cited. What still keeps
presumptions in this sense linked with the modern conception is the fact that
they have normative force: presumptions are not merely assumptions which
people hold de facto, but premises on which one is entitled to rely de iure.
In accordance with the broad scope of his conception of presumptions, Pilius
chooses for his treatment a conceptual scheme which is clearly rooted in the
rhetorical theory of the status rationales; this scheme, which he probably
derived from a work on canon law, the Summa of Sicard of Cremona, which
had been published a few years earlier12, uses two basic distinctions: first that
between extrinsic and intrinsic facts; extrinsic facts extend from observable
actions to questions of intentionality and negligence;13 the category of intrinsic
facts includes in Pilius' view matters such as a person's specific intentions or
consent, or the interpretation of the law or of a written document14. After this
first basic distinction, the second leads us directly to the status rationales: it
differentiates between doubts about the substance15 and the quality of a fact;
the former concerns the question whether something was done or not, the latter
the question whether it is good or bad (LPD 36v)16. These are precisely the
questions which characterize the rhetorical status of coniectura (matters of
fact) and qualitas (matters of quality); the status of definitio (matters of
definition) is no longer part of the scheme, since its presence was based on a
distinction between the legal and the extra-legal characterization of actions,
which has no place in a fully-developed and professionalized legal system
where all aspects of the judicial evaluation of an act are seen as subject to law,
which incorporates both specific written legal rules and general principles of
law and equity17.
Within the issue of the substance of extrinsic facts, equivalent to the rhetorical
issue of coniectura, the scheme used by Pilius further distinguishes a number
of topics (LPD 36v f.). His predecessors even use the term locus, familiar from
the tradition of rhetoric and dialectic, while Pilius uses the term modus, which
was generally applied to types of arguments in the work of the glossators.
These places or modes of presuming are readily recognizable as in large part
derived from the rhetorical topics of the person and the act. Thus we find here
references to the person of the agent and the person with whom the agent
interacts, to time, place, and mode of action, to the habits, associates, age
and necessities of the agent, to subsequent actions, indications, and rumors
concerning the act; to these Pilius adds a number of general considerations
affecting the evaluation of an act rather more than the question whether it did in
fact occur (LPD 37r);18 this, too, has a precedent in the topics of the
consequences of the act in rhetorical theory.19
The rhetorical topics of the person and the act are also the main source for the
classification of modes of arguing about the quality of extrinsic facts in Pilius'
scheme (LPD 37r ff.). The applicability of these topics to the issue of quality as
well as to the issue of conjecture is implied by the fact that in classical
rhetorical theory they had been introduced as components of all proof; but their
presence in the evaluation as well as in the ascertainment of facts is actually
brought out more clearly here in Pilius' work than in rhetorical handbooks such
as Cicero's De inventione, which was one of the main texts used for rhetorical
instruction in that period. Again Pilius adds to the scheme of his canon law
predecessors some further modes which he has found emphasized in his
Roman law sources (LPD 38v f.; Lang 1942: 130. And he greatly expands the
category ex causa (from the case), under which he includes a large number of
special circumstances and case types (LPD 39r ff.); here we also find some
modes of presuming related to Cicero's more dialectically oriented topics
adiuncta negotio (LPD 40v ff.), such as genus and species (LPD 40v), the
greater and the lesser (LPD 43v), and part and whole (LPD 48v f.).20
What distinguishes Pilus' treatment of these topics from that in the rhetorical
handbooks, apart from additions to and adaptations of modes of presuming
derived from a much expanded body of technical law, is the source from which
the probabilities invoked derive their probative force. In the classical tradition
of rhetoric it was the common sense of the community, a view of how the world
worked and should work, premises posited by the orator as shared between
him and the deciding audience, which undergirded the artistic arguments of the
rhetor. But now, in a more technically complex and increasingly
professionalized legal system, the lawyer's argumentative art focuses on the
law as the primary foundation of forensic arguments. In order to establish that
the legal advocate is entitled to rely on certain presumptions, Pilius supports
every topic he introduces with often copious references to his legal sources,
citing primarily the Corpus Iuris.
Pilius' audience consists of professional jurists, who are expected to find the
modes of presuming persuasive because they are authoritatively supported,
not because they recognize in the advocates' assumptions their own. But that
contrast should not be overstated: On the one hand, the juristic sources
themselves are to a considerable extent a codification of common sense; and
on the other, as Pilius' treatment of these arguments shows very clearly, the
authorities cited do not completely determine either the advocate's argument
or the judge's decision. And what links the ancient rhetor and the medieval
jurist is the search, among the premises endorsed as persuasive or even
recognized as binding by the audience, for arguments which can support both
sides in a controversial case.
Pilius provides a systematic presentation of authoritative sources for
arguments supporting as well as opposing contentions such as: that a certain
act has been or will be committed or not committed; that the act was
permissible or impermissible; that intent or negligence were or were not
present; that the agent did or did not have certain intentions, did or did not
know certain things; that such knowledge or ignorance does or does not have
legal significance; that consent was or was not given; that laws or declarations
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly; that an act should or should not be
regarded as aggravated or excused or mitigated by circumstances; that
someone should or should not be punished for the actions of another, etc., etc.
The opposition between the principles invoked for and against such
contentions is not treated primarily as posing a theoretical problem which calls
for a resolution, but as an opportunity for finding arguments for and against the
propositions in question. Which of these arguments to use is in effect left to the
judgment of the advocate, which to accept to the discretion of the judge.
We can now end this brief look at an example of the medieval legal uses of
presumptions by also noting two points:
(1) For Pilius, legal presumptions are not monolithic rules that
unequivocally determine in advance in every case which side in a
dispute has a unitary presumption in its favor.
(2) Instead, his discussion emphasizes that in controversial cases
a variety of presumptions tend to be available to both sides, and
that the outcome depends on which of the arguments presented
persuade the judging audience.
IV
In conclusion, I will sketch rather than fully discuss two ways in which this highly
compressed historical survey of the development of legal presumptions
impinges on contemporary discussions of the function of presumptions in
argumentation.
First, I would like to suggest that the treatment of presumptions in Pilius'
Libellus Disputatorius shows that the supposedly "legal" conception which
traditional textbook treatments of presumptions have associated with Whately
is not only questionably attributed to that author,21 but that it is not even an
adequate representation of the way presumptions operate in the law. Legal
presumptions do not constitute (1) "a unitary advantage that is objectively
assigned by rules [...] to the side that upholds the status quo," and they do not
require (2) "that all affirmative argument be encumbered by a corollary burden
of proof such that the affirmative must amass a preponderance of evidence [...]
on all crucial issues."22 Legal presumptions as discussed by Pilius rather
approximate the psychological notion of presumption ascribed to Whately by
Michael Sproule, a conception constructing presumption "as consisting of (1) a
potentially great number of argumentative advantages, which (2) may be
simultaneously conferred on both sides of dispute;" and even if they do not
result, as do such psychological preferences, from "audience preferences for
particular arguments or sources of information,"23 but rather on authoritative
legal pronouncements, such preferences will still have an important influence
on the interpretation and acceptance of presumptions by the judging audience.
Admittedly Pilius is more forthright than many more recent writers on legal
presumptions in highlighting the rhetorical openness inherent in legal
argumentation, but this is increasingly being acknowledged in contemporary
literature on the subject as well.24
At the same time I think that this proximity of the "psychological" burden of
proof to legal presumptions should also encourage us to look more closely for
the normative as well as empirical elements entering into audiences'
constructions of their presumptions, as well as into speakers' constructions of
these same audience presumptions.
Finally, our look at the role of presumptions in the Roman law of the Corpus
Iuris suggests that Gaskin's discussion of the rhetorical uses of burdens of
proof in modern discourse (Gaskins 1992) points to argumentative procedures
that can already be found in ancient law. But this comparison also suggests
that the masking of substantive considerations behind the procedural shift of
the burden of proof (Gaskins 1992: 47ff., 75 ff.) can perhaps not be quite as
rhetorically effective as Gaskins appears to assume; the substance behind the
procedure must still be persuasive if the shift of the burden of proof is to be
effective.
A good example of this is actually provided by the school desegregation cases
that Gaskins discusses extensively (Gaskins 1992: 54ff.) After Brown v. Board
of Education (347 U.S. 483 [1954]), which avoided a formal overruling of the
"separate but equal" doctrine25 by purporting to find that segregated schools
simply could not be both separate and equal, some courts in the South took
this apparent shift in the burden of proof at face value and heard and accepted
factual evidence that schools could in fact be equal through segregated26.
Defenders of the United States Supreme Court's decision shifted from matters
of factual proof to an emphasis on the moral unacceptability of segregation,27
and the Court itself finally made the openly legal pronouncement that it is "no
longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require
segregation of public facilities."28 What this may suggest is that in every case
in which a reliance on the burden of proof is central to the openly declared
argument, the audience of the Court must still be able to recognize and willing
to be persuaded by an underlying substantive argument, based on the
consequences achieved and the values served by this shift, if this rhetorical
strategy is to work.
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documents; and eventually they also addressed questions which Cicero
assigns to the other part of the constitutio generalis, the constitutio iuridicalis,
whose name already signals its link with matters of law.
18These are not to be found in Sicardus' Summa and the Perpendiculum;
see Lang 1942: 128f.
19For the consecutio negotii see, e.g., Cicero, De inventione 1.28.43; for the
topical theory of the attributes of the person or the act as the core of
argumentative proof see ibid. 1.24.34ff. For a discussion of the development
of that theory in Roman Antiquity see Leff 1983.
20Cf. Cicero De inventione 1.28.41f. on the adiuncta negotio; on the
dialectical cast of these topoi see Leff 1983: 30.
21That is the central contention argued in Sproule 1976.
22These are characteristics of the "legal" conception of presumption in
argumentation pointed out by Sproule 1976: 126.
23These are elements of the interpretation of Whatelian presumption offered
by Sproule 1976: 115.
24For an overview see, e.g., Gaskins 1992: 15ff.
25Established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26See, e.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, 220
F.Supp. 667 (S.D.Ga. 1963); reversed 318 F.2d. 425 (5th Cir. 1963).
27See, e.g., Cahn 1955.
28Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1964).
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